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Abstract
This paper contributes to the debate on optimal bankruptcy reform by providing a set of results
that challenge the wisdom that “soft” bankruptcy codes have necessarily positive effects. The
model hinges on the key idea that “soft” bankruptcy allows a poor performing entrepreneur
to renegotiate the terms of the initial contract with a lender. In the presence of moral hazard,
the optimal arrangement requires the hampering of project’s continuation as punishment for
poor performance. However, if the lender can increase recovery rates in bankruptcy such pun-
ishment is not renegotiation-proof. Clearly, this exacerbates the agency problem and creates a
tension between ex-post and ex-ante efficiency that may impede the implementation of long-
term projects.
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The literature in the fields of law and economics has traditionally distinguished the American
“soft” approach to bankruptcy from the “tough” one of European legislators. Recently, this
dichotomy has been put at stake by a process of convergence due to the adoption, in major
European countries, of bankruptcy codes inspired by U.S. Chapter 11. The European Com-
mission has undertaken important actions to support this process, based on the presumption
that a harsh approach to failure would deter risk taking, experimentation and innovation:1
the belief of the Commission is that bankruptcy favors entrepreneurial initiative if it treats
failure in a “soft” fashion.
Several European countries have consequently reformed their bankruptcy codes. In Ger-
many, the reform of 1999 introduced a system of corporate reorganization analogous to
Chapter 11 in the balance of creditors’ and debtors’ rights. More precisely, as in Chapter
11, Germany’s Insolvenzverfahren prescribes the right of the entrepreneur to open the reor-
ganization phase, the automatic stay on creditors’ claims, the super-seniority of lenders that
fund the bankrupt firm and creditors’ right to decide over the approval of the reorganization
plan. Instead, unlike Chapter 11, it is a court-appointed administrator that formulates the
reorganization plan and not the bankrupt management. In Italy, before the 2006 reform, the
insolvency procedure was rather “tough” with debtors, as bankrupt entrepreneurs were sub-
ject to a long phase of rehabilitation before they could start a new enterprise and have access
to new credit. In the current regime, instead, before the opening of the liquidation phase, the
entrepreneur has the right to start a process of reorganization (concordato preventivo) and
negotiate with creditors over the restructuring of outstanding liabilities, as in Chapter 11. In
2005, the French legislator reformed insolvency law introducing the procèdure de sauvegarde:
the new system gives the right to the incumbent management to open the reorganization
phase and retain control over the company while devising a restructuring plan, protected
also by the automatic stay of creditors’ claims. In other words, Germany, Italy and France
implemented a “soft” regime and, more interestingly, the new systems have been designed
adopting some of the key features of Chapter 11.2
1See the website http : //ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/sme2chance/ for a detailed de-
scription of the initiatives undertaken since 2002 by the Commission to promote a more lenient cultural and
legislative environment towards entrepreneurial failure.
2Section 2 provides a short synopsis on Chapter 11 and its features. See Stanghellini (2007) for a general
overview of bankruptcy law and economics and Brouwer (2006) for a comparative analysis between the United
States and Europe on the discipline of reorganization in bankruptcy. Finally, see Franks and Davydenko
(2008) for an empirical study of how differences over creditors’ rights among France, UK and Germany
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The international financial meltdown triggered in the Fall of 2008 by the failure of major
US credit institutions has pushed a number of firms onto the verge of bankruptcy. Standard
& Poor’s reports that the default rate related to European companies in its speculative-grade
category is expected to rise to 11.1% in 2009 and 2010, from 3.2% over the last fifteen years.3
Clearly, this poses an important challenge to the recently adopted bankruptcy schemes,
because a successful restructuring of the distressed companies involved in the crisis is crucial
to sparkle a fast process of recovery.
We contribute to the debate on bankruptcy reform by providing a set of results that
challenge the wisdom that “soft” bankruptcy codes have necessarily positive effects. Indeed,
we show that a lenient procedure may bring about a problem of short-termism in investment
decisions.
This paper presents a stylized principal-agent model with repeated moral hazard, in which
a cash constrained entrepreneur can choose to undertake either a short-term project or a
long-term project. The short-term project is completed in one period and returns a lower
net present value than the long-term project. However, the long-term project requires two
periods to be completed and exposes the entrepreneur to the risk of bankruptcy.4
Our aim is to compare the impact on investment decisions of a bankruptcy game that tries
to replicate the most salient features of a real “soft” code, with respect to a benchmark case
in which liquidation follows automatically in a case of insolvency. Bankruptcy is modeled
through the implications that it imparts on an entrepreneur’s future and, strictly specking,
it consists in a renegotiation game that resembles Chapter 11 in the balance of lenders’ and
entrepreneur’s rights.
The short-termism result is derived in two steps. Firstly, we prove that lenders’ behavior
is characterized by limited commitment under “soft” bankruptcy. We do this by following
a mechanism borrowed from the literature on the “soft budget constraint” problem.5 If
the bankrupt entrepreneur finds new funds to carry on the project during the phase of
financial restructuring, existing lenders are tempted to approve the project’s continuation
and renegotiate the prescription of termination contained in the initial contract. On the one
hand, this increases ex-post efficiency because investors improve recovery rates but on the
insolvency systems have an impact over banks’ lending decisions to distressed companies.
3See The Economist, “Out of Pocket”, December 2008 issue.
4In order to make things more concrete, in what follows the short-term project is designed as a risk-free
investment, like a government bond. Instead, the long-term project is an investment that may deliver high
long-run payoffs at the cost of early failures, like the investments in R&D.
5This literature highlights the costs to a principal from the lack of commitment to remain tough with an
agent. See the seminal paper by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Kornai et al. (2003).
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other hand, it decreases ex-ante efficiency because the prospect of renegotiation raises the
agency rent that investors need to bear to induce the right incentives.
Secondly, we show that the problem of limited commitment generates short-termism. In-
deed, the higher transfer that lenders need to bear to cope with the repeated moral hazard
problem makes the long run project unimplementable without violating entrepreneur’s in-
centives and this induces the same entrepreneur to prefer projects that return immediate
results, but that are not subject to the risk of bankruptcy.6
The paper contributes to the analysis of bankruptcy presenting three additional results.
The first is that the bias towards the achievement of short-term results holds even if the
bankrupt entrepreneur can undertake a process of technological restructuring following a
bad outcome. More specifically, in the extension with bankruptcy and technological restruc-
turing, we contrast the two conflicting forces triggered by the “soft budget constraint” effect.
Firstly, we have the one put forward by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and von Thadden
(1995), where it is shown that hardening the budget constraint may bring to an end valu-
able, but slow, projects. Secondly, the one put forward by this paper, where we show that
softening the budget constraint also causes an increase of agency costs. The result of this
extension is that the investment choice is efficient only if the probability that a low outcome
is caused by exogenous adverse shocks is high enough. Otherwise, provided the moral hazard
problem is severe enough, the short-termism problem arises.
The second regards the effect of competition on financial markets on the investment
choice: in a context with monopoly lending, we show that the short-termism result is further
reinforced with respect to the environment with competitive financial markets. In the case
with competitive lending, the entrepreneur is able to fully squeeze the net value of the long-
term project and therefore, the project is always undertaken if implementable. Instead,
the monopoly lender must take into account entrepreneur’s agency rent when comparing
projects’ profitability and as such, rent increases in the “soft” bankruptcy framework to
make the long-term project unprofitable, independently from recovery rates.
The third result is that the existence of collateral alleviates the soft-budget constraint
problem and facilitates the choice of the long term project by the entrepreneur. Intuitively,
6It has to be remarked that the mechanism by which short-termism arises in this paper is different than
the one in Diamond (2004). Indeed, Diamond (2004) shows that in weak legal environments and with
multiple lenders, short-term debt is the contract that allows a creditor to minimize the dead weight loss that
he would suffer from a run on a borrower by the other lenders. In other words, Diamond (2004) shows that
holding the right to neglect refunding, and keep the budget constraint tight, a lender is less exposed to the
negative externality imposed by other lenders when these require for an early stage repayment.
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collateral rises recovery rates in the event of project’s failure and reduces the rent that the
entrepreneur can extract by misbehaving.
The model sheds light on a type of costs caused by reorganization in bankruptcy that,
so far, have been neglected by the law and economics literature. However, two pieces of
empirical evidence support our conclusions. The first, and more important, is due to John
et al. (2008), in which it is shown that strong creditor rights induce firms’ insiders and
managers to choose more valuable investment projects by hampering the opportunities of
rent extraction generated by opportunistic conduct.
The second is in a number of empirical analyses that show that risk-premia and short-
term lending are positively correlated with bankruptcy law degree of “leniency” (see Blume
et al., 1980; Corbett, 1987; Poterba and Summers, 1995; Qian and Strahan, 2007).7
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a short introduction to Chapter 11, Section
3 compares our findings with those established in related papers and Section 4 presents the
main model. In Section 5, we discuss the benchmark case in which the lender can commit
to the optimal initial contract with the entrepreneur and liquidate the firm in case of a
project’s failure, while in Section 6 we relax the assumption of full commitment and study
the effects of “soft” bankruptcy. Section 7 proves that the main result carries over even if the
entrepreneur is allowed to undertake a process of technological restructuring in bankruptcy.
In Section 8, we solve the model under the assumption of monopolistic lending and Section
9 discusses a variant of the main model with collateral. Section 10 discusses the empirical
predictions and the policy conclusion of the paper. Finally, Section 11 concludes.
2 Chapter 11
In the United States, Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law provide the federal
discipline that regulates corporate insolvency procedures. Chapter 7 governs the phase of
liquidation, while Chapter 11 governs the process of financial restructuring. They are both
carried out under the oversight of specialized bankruptcy courts.
Chapter 11 ultimate target is to protect a bankrupt firm from outsiders’ pressure while it
is coping with a process of rehabilitation. Chapter 11 prescribes a system of countervailing
rights aimed at protecting both creditors’ and debtors’ interests. On the debtors’ side is the
provision that allows the entrepreneur to file unilaterally for Chapter 11, at the prospect
of potential default. Entry into Chapter 11 opens the Debtor-in-Possession (or DIP) phase,
7See Section 10 for a more detailed discussion on our testable predictions and policy conclusion.
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during which the entrepreneur has the right to stop payments to existing investors (automatic
stay) and devise a restructuring plan to be submitted to creditors by a given period of time.8
During the Debtor-In-Possession phase, the entrepreneur can also search for new funds and in
order to facilitate this, Chapter 11 prescribes that the investors willing to finance bankrupt
firms are privileged in the reimbursement of their claims at the end of the restructuring
process - i.e., they can be repaid before (even senior) existing investors.
Creditors have two important rights in Chapter 11: first, they can propose an alternative
plan to the entrepreneur’s and second, they vote on the restructuring project in a ballot
disciplined by a system of qualified majorities.9 In fact, by rejecting the plan, creditors can
reverse the restructuring procedure into a Chapter 7 liquidation process.
In the model, we compare the impact of a variety of renegotiation environments in
bankruptcy over ex ante investment choices. More specifically, the main bankruptcy game
we will consider is based on Chapter 11 and the rights it grants to contracting parties. Par-
ticular emphasis is given to two of them: the right that the entrepreneur has to unilaterally
file for bankruptcy, search for new funds and devise a restructuring plan, and the right that
lenders have to vote on the same plan.
3 Related Literature
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) has been the first to show how inefficient decisions over
bankrupt firms’ continuation distort ex ante corporate investment choices. In this literature,
however, two papers are particularly close in spirit to this one; Bebchuk (2002) and Acharya
and Subramanian (forthcoming). Bebchuk (2002) focuses on how the APR deviations that
characterize Chapter 11 proceedings influence equity-holders choice between two investment
projects, one riskier than the other. Bebchuk (2002) shows that equity-holders may be
tempted to choose the risky project because in failure states they are able to secure a positive
rent from Chapter 11 negotiations. However, Bebchuk (2002) implicitly assumes that the
creditors are unaware of the type of investment projects available to the equity-holders.
Instead, in this paper we assume that a lender can observe and verify the investment plan
that the entrepreneur undertakes, and designs the optimal contract as to induce her to choose
the most profitable one. Consequently, we derive the investment strategy choice as a function
8The deadline is set by law at 120 days, but the bankruptcy judge can concede extensions.
9Creditors vote on the plan by classes of seniority. More specifically, an entire class of claims is deemed
to accept a plan if the plan is accepted by creditors that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than
one-half in number. A vote of acceptance by a class binds all creditors in the class.
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of the optimal equilibrium contracts and study how the same choice changes with the type
of bankruptcy. Acharya and Subramanian (forthcoming) studies how different bankruptcy
types impact on firms’ decision over innovation and capital structure. The main result of
this paper is that firms that operate in an economy with a “soft” bankruptcy procedure are
more prone to carry out innovative strategies. This conclusion is driven by income tax and
bankruptcy costs, instead in our model it is the costs associated to the limited commitment
problem that crucially determine the investment strategy chosen at equilibrium.
An important strand of the economic literature on bankruptcy emphasizes the trade-off
between the excessive liquidation caused by “tough” procedures and the excessive continu-
ation generated by “soft” procedures.10 For example, White (1994) investigates the role of
bankruptcy as a filtering device in a model with adverse selection and highlights the way
bankruptcy can distort liquidation/continuation decisions. Our paper focuses on the agency
costs caused by moral hazard and limited commitment. The costs generated by moral hazard
induce the parties to write a contract that prescribes termination in case of project’s failure.
The problem of limited commitment associated to “soft” procedures, though, weakens this
threat and forces the lender to grant a higher monetary transfer in order to induce the right
incentives on entrepreneur’s side.
This paper is also related to the literature that studies the decision over corporate strate-
gies’ horizon. In particular, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and von Thadden (1995) in-
vestigate the relationship between the “soft budget constraint” problem and investments’
horizon, concluding that hardening the budget constraint may induce short-termism in in-
vestment behavior.11 In these papers, it is shown that neglecting the refunding of projects
that yield a low outcome in the short-term hinders the implementation of both bad projects,
and slow, but good, projects that are able to generate very high gains only in the long-run.
Clearly, this is not efficient if the higher profitability of long-term projects offsets the losses
caused by bad projects. We contribute to this literature by showing that hardening the budget
constraint induces long-termism because it allows investors to keep the termination threat
credible and limit the costs associated with the problem of repeated moral hazard.
10This trade-off has also influenced the debate over the design of the optimal bankruptcy reform. See Hart
(1995), chapter 7, for a comprehensive discussion on this topic.
11In particular, our model differs from von Thadden (1995) insofar as we assume that the lender can
observe the project chosen by the firm but cannot observe first period profits. Moreover, we differ from
Baliga and Polak (2004), which also builds on Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) by introducing a problem of
moral hazard, because there authors employ a one-shot game to study the choice between monitored and
non-monitored loans.
7
Recent theoretical and empirical contributions show that “soft” bankruptcy procedures
foster innovation and entrepreneurship. For example, Acharya and Subramanian (forthcom-
ing) provides empirical evidence on how “soft” codes foster innovation, Biais and Mariotti
(2009) develops a model that shows how these procedures produce positive externalities at
a general equilibrium level and Landier (2006) proves that “soft” bankruptcy stimulates
entrepreneurial initiative. More specifically, Landier (2006) develops a model where the atti-
tude of capital markets towards failure is endogenous: entrepreneurship depends on the cost
of funding, which in turn depends on markets’ expectations over failed entrepreneurs’ ability.
Landier (2006) shows that “soft” bankruptcy rules stimulate entrepreneurship because they
grant a complete debt relief to the failed entrepreneur and reduce the cost of capital neces-
sary to start new projects. With respect to the analysis in Landier (2006), we let the cost of
funding depend on the severity of the moral hazard problem, which depends on bankruptcy
law.
Finally, the main result of the paper follows from the assumption for which parties can
renegotiate the initial contract through bankruptcy: this weakens ex ante incentives but
alleviates ex post efficiency loss. Therefore, like in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the main
focus is on the renegotiation game that is carried out between lender and entrepreneur.
However, the aim of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) is to determine the optimal number of
creditors that is able to minimize the trade-off between entrepreneur’s ex ante incentives to
default strategically and the ex post efficiency costs generated by liquidation. Instead, in
this paper we are more concerned about the impact of renegotiation on firm’s investment
plans.
4 The Model
The model analyses a financing game in an environment characterized by asymmetric infor-
mation and entrepreneur’s limited liability. There are two classes of risk-neutral agents in
our economy: a cash constrained entrepreneur (or borrower, she) and competing lenders.12
In what follows, we assume that each entrepreneur obtains funding from a single lender
(or investor, he) and focus on a representative entrepreneur-lender pair. Moreover, market
interest rates are normalized to zero.
The entrepreneur decides the time horizon of the investment and this decision is observed
12In fact, what follows also applies to managerial firms in which managers’ interests are perfectly aligned
with equity-holders’.
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and verified by the lender. More specifically, the entrepreneur can choose between two
projects: a short-term project (S) and a long-term project (L). This choice influences firm’s
expected revenues in the following way. The short-term project is modeled as an outside
option that returns a net payoff of ΠS > 0.
13 The long-term project extends over up to two
periods, it requires an outlay of I > 0 to be started and a further infusion of Î > 0 to be
completed. In the first period, project L delivers a payoff equal to Π > 0 in the case of
success, and zero in the case of failure. Finally, in the second period, the project generates
an expected return equal to Π̂ > 0 independently from first period outcome.
The profitability of the long-term project is subject to two problems of asymmetric in-
formation. Firstly, the entrepreneur must decide in each period whether to exert effort or
shirk. In the first period, the moral hazard problem is designed as in Holmström-Tirole
(1997). More specifically, we assume that if the entrepreneur puts in effort, she would suc-
ceed with certainty and if she shirks, she would fail with certainty but gain private benefits
B > 0.14 In the second period, the moral hazard problem is designed in a reduced form: the
entrepreneur requires the payment of a reward at least equal to B̂ > 0 to put in effort.
Secondly, we assume that the entrepreneur privately observes the project’s first period
outcome. This assumption follows Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and is equivalent to as-
suming that the lender needs to bear an infinite cost to observe the true state. The main
implication of this hypothesis is that long-term contingent contracts are not feasible in this
setting. In other words, we are limiting the scope of our analysis to short-term contracts, in
which refunding decisions depend on the results reported at the end of the first period by
the entrepreneur.15
Time-line and cash flow of the game are given in Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The entrepreneur holds all the bargaining power at the contracting stage: she makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the lender that specifies the project she wants to carry out and
13ΠS corresponds to the net surplus yielded by project S to the agent that holds the bargaining power in
the contracting phase. This assumption allows to greatly simplify the analysis. However, what is sufficient
for the main result to hold is that project S is not subject to the risk of bankruptcy.
14This assumption allows to deliver a sharper result than with intermediate probabilities of success (failure).
We would like to remark that the nature of the results would not change assuming that the probability of
success (failure) is positive and into the unit interval.
15It is important to remark that here project’s payoff is function of a decision over effort provision, therefore,
it is not randomly determined. This implies that our game is not a signaling game of the Gale and Hellwig
(1989) type.
9
the contract that would implement it.16 If the lender accepts the offer, he provides initial
funding and the project is started. The class of contractual mechanisms we focus on are
composed by two instruments: a per period repayment from the entrepreneur to the lender
and project’s continuation decisions. The repayment required in the first period is denoted
by R, while the transfer required in the second period is denoted by R̂. Lenders’ decisions
over project continuation are denoted by ζj = {0, 1}, with j = Π, 0, and depend on first
period revealed payoff: if the entrepreneur reports Π (zero), the project is refunded when
ζΠ = 1 (ζ0 = 1), terminated otherwise (ζj = 0, with j = Π, 0). Entry into bankruptcy takes
place when the entrepreneur does not repay as much as is required in the contract and the
implications for the firm depend on bankruptcy code. In Section 4.1, we will be more specific
on how the game develops in bankruptcy states.
We introduce four assumptions on the parameters of the model.
Assumption 1.
i. Π > B;
ii. Π > I;
iii. Π̂− Î − B̂ > 0.
iv. Π̂− Î − I > 0.
Assumption (1.i) implies that, in the first period, entrepreneur’s choice over profit’s reve-
lation is more binding than the one related to effort provision, Assumption (1.ii) implies that
the long-term project has positive net present value in the first period, Assumption (1.iii)
implies that the long-term project has positive pledgeable income in the second period,17 and
Assumption (1.iv) implies that the truth telling problem is not relevant in the benchmark
case without bankruptcy.
The optimal mechanism that implements strategy L is found by solving, by backward
induction, for the sequential incentive problems in t = 2 and t = 1. The equilibrium concept
we shall employ is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE).
4.1 The Bankruptcy Game
Renegotiation takes place in bankruptcy and is compliant to bankruptcy code’s prescrip-
tions. This implies that bankrupt entrepreneurs are allowed to renegotiate the termination
clause only under the mechanisms provided by the law. In particular, in insolvency states,
16Clearly, the way we model project S implies that the relative contract just specifies how ΠS is split.
17By pledgeable income we mean the surplus delivered by the project net of the cost related with investment
allotment and private benefits.
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the following bankruptcy game takes place.
1. The entrepreneur searches for new funds on competitive financial markets.
2. If the entrepreneur finds a new lender, this lender makes her an offer.
3. In the case of offer acceptance, the first period lender (or old lender) must decide either
to agree on the continuation plan or reject it. More specifically, such a decision is the
outcome of an ultimatum game in which the old lender has all the bargaining power
and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent. This offer specifies the payoff that
the lender requires to allow project continuation and is denoted by r̂.
4. If the entrepreneur accepts the old lender’s offer, the firm continues its activity and the
second period time structure is the same as in case of continuation out of bankruptcy.
Otherwise, the firm is shut down and the entrepreneur is dismissed.
In bankruptcy, both the second period effort decision and the the project’s cash flow
distribution are modeled as out of bankruptcy.
Two points must be stressed. Firstly, the lender that provides new liquidity in the second
stage of the renegotiation game must not be necessarily different from the first period one.
Indeed, in both cases the model would deliver the same type of results.18
Secondly, the choice to structure the renegotiation phase as an ultimatum game implies
that the allocation of the bargaining power determines the equilibrium outcomes. We assume
that the old lender has all the bargaining power in bankruptcy. This hypothesis may seem
limiting because it does not capture the interactions that take place among creditors and
debtors under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge in a real Chapter 11. However,
weakening old lender’s bargaining power would only reinforce our conclusions. In fact, the
model shows that even when the initial lender holds the power to decide whether to enforce
the contract or not (asking for a huge value of r̂, for instance), he may eventually accept
renegotiation.19
18It is worth noticing that the empirical evidence provided by Daihya et al. (2003) on Chapter 11 Debtor-
In-Possession funding contracts confirms that bankrupt firms do receive money from both investors with
whom they already have a lending relationship and new investors.
19In relation to this feature of the game, it is interesting to remark that during Chapter 11 voting phase the
bankruptcy judge can “cram-down” a restructuring plan, even against old lender’s will, if she/he believes that
the plan preserves firm’s value as a going concern. Explicitly introducing this into the renegotiation game
would further exacerbate the “soft-budget constraint problem” that we highlight, since it would increase
entrepreneur’s outside option during negotiations.
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4.2 First Best
Analyze first the scenario in which the entrepreneur is not cash constrained and there is
no problem of moral hazard. We assume that in these circumstances the long-term project
generates a net present value higher than the one attached to the short-term project and
therefore determines the value of the firm in the first best scenario.
Π− I + Π̂− Î > ΠS. (FB)
In what follows, it is first presented how the contracting game changes when the moral
hazard problems are introduced into the analysis and then when the problem of limited
commitment is accounted for.
5 Optimal Contract with Full Commitment
In this section, we derive the equilibrium contract that the lender may want to propose to
the entrepreneur under the assumption of full commitment. With respect to the first best
scenario, we introduce the problem of repeated moral hazard. Therefore, in this setting, the
constraints related to an entrepreneur’s private decisions on effort provision and payoff reve-
lation must be taken into account. Nevertheless, thanks to full commitment, the bankruptcy
code does not affect the investment strategy choice because at the interim stage, no matter
what the law prescribes, the lender sticks to the contract signed at the outset and imposes
liquidation on the firm.
Lemma 1 presents the equilibrium of the contracting game.
Lemma 1.
Denote by CFC the equilibrium contract that implements the long-term investment strategy
L under full commitment. CFC specifies that:
CFC ≡ {R = I, R̂ = Î}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 0}.
Consequently, borrower’s utility under project L at equilibrium, denoted UFC , is:
UFC = Π− I + Π̂− Î > 0. (1)
The lender breaks even in expectation.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that CFC induces the entrepreneur to put in effort in both periods and truthfully
reveal first period outcome. Also, CFC can be implemented by a sequence of short-term
standard debt contracts that require the repayment of a fixed amount at the end of each
period.
Clearly, the choice of the project depends on the comparison of entrepreneur’s utility
under S and L.
Proposition 1.
Under full commitment, the entrepreneur chooses the long-term project L. Therefore, the
entrepreneur offers CFC to the lender and project L is started if the lender accepts and pro-
vides I.
To begin with, notice that the contract specifies that if the entrepreneur does not report
Π the firm is not refunded (ζ0 = 0) and is put in bankruptcy (0 < R). In other words,
even in a setting with positive second period expected value, it is optimal to terminate the
project and push the entrepreneur to bankruptcy. Moreover, the assumption of competitive
financial markets implies that the entrepreneur is able to squeeze all the value of project
L, hence the first best is attained. Finally, the profitability of the long-term project is not
affected by bankruptcy because renegotiation is not allowed under full commitment.
6 Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment
In this section, we present how the contracting game changes under the assumption of limited
commitment. The departure from full commitment implies that lender’s ability to enforce
the optimal contract depends on bankruptcy law. If the procedure is “soft”, the bankrupt
entrepreneur has the right to search for new lenders and the old lender has the power to
permit or prevent continuation. In this section, we show that he allows continuation because
this makes recovery rates improve. Consequently, a tension arises between ex-post and ex-
ante efficiency, which determines the resulting investment strategy choice.
Proposition 2.
Under limited commitment, two scenarios can arise, depending on the value of project L
13
expected pledgeable income in the second period:
i. If Π̂− Î − B̂ < I, project S is chosen by the entrepreneur, the lender breaks even and
the entrepreneur takes ΠS. Finally, project S is implemented if the lender accepts the
offer.
ii. If Π̂− Î − B̂ ≥ I, the entrepreneur offers CLC to the lender.
CLC ≡ {R = I, R̂ = Î , r̂ = I}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 1}.
Borrower’s utility under CLC, denoted ULC, is:
ULC = Π− I + Π̂− Î > 0.
The lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, if the lender accepts the offer, project L is
implemented.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This proposition shows that “soft” bankruptcy procedures may cause a bias toward short-
termism in firm’s investment behavior. The intuition for this result is as follows. On the
one hand, a lenient procedure reduces the instruments available to cope with entrepreneur’s
moral hazard. On the other hand, it allows for an improvement in recovery rates in the case
of first period insolvency. Indeed, once the assumption of full commitment is relaxed, we
show that it is not rational to the old lender, at the interim stage, to refuse any finite rent
from renegotiation, even if this comes at the cost of loosening the refunding decisions.
The bankruptcy game that we employ reverses the bargaining power allocation with re-
spect to the initial contracting stage, in which it is the entrepreneur to hold all the bargaining
power. However, this assumption does not reinforce our result. If the entrepreneur was to
hold all monopoly power at the renegotiation stage, then the equilibrium of the investment
game would never feature the choice of the long-term project because the entrepreneur would
squeeze project’s net present value in full and the lender would never retrieve I through the
recovery rates.
Our main finding is that, unless the lender is able to recover in full the initial outlay,
the exacerbation of the agency costs caused by the relaxation of the termination threat is
not offset by the transfer r̂ required by the lender to permit continuation in bankruptcy. In
other words, the entrepreneur would always have incentive to divert first period profits and
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project L would not be profitable from the lenders’ viewpoint. This result is supported by
the empirical evidence in Franks and Sussman (2005). Franks and Sussman (2005) shows
that in the UK, where bankruptcy law is relatively “tough” and SMEs’ credit exposure is
rather concentrated, senior lenders commit to a severe stance towards debt renegotiations,
and it is argued that this is done to avoid strategic default. Similarly, we show that the
lender is more likely to keep a tough stance against debt renegotiation in bankruptcy when
recovery rates do not allow the recouping in full of the outstanding liability.
The model’s result that tightening the termination threat allows for the implementation
of more valuable projects is supported by the findings of the empirical analysis of John et
al. (2008). Indeed, John et al. (2008) claims that strong creditor protection induces firms’
insiders and managers to choose more valuable investment strategies by hampering their
rent extraction behavior. This conclusion, and the intuition behind, is consistent with our
conclusions.
Further evidence to the short-termism result is in the surveys that look at financial condi-
tions set by investors at the contracting stage (see Blume et al., 1980; Corbett, 1987; Poterba
and Summers, 1995). These studyes show that, in Anglo-Saxon countries, the cut-off rates
required by investors are bigger, and the lending horizon is shorter, than in Continental
Europe, bearing witness to the greater pressure exerted towards the achievement of short-
term outcomes. Finally, Qian and Strahan (2007) shows that stronger creditor protection is
correlated with bigger interest rates and longer term financing.
7 Bankruptcy and Technological Restructuring
The model in Section 4 allows us to present a sharp result, but does not take into account
that restructuring in bankruptcy may give a second chance to ventures in difficulties. In
particular, we forego the impact that a technological restructuring process would impart on
firm’s value. This is an important feature of Chapter 11 and it is particularly important if
failure is caused by exogenous circumstances, like an adverse shock.
In this extension, we design the investment game to give the bankrupt entrepreneur the
power to re-establish the venture’s profitability following a first period project failure or after
a negative shock that fully depletes first period project value. In this way, we contrast the
two conflicting forces triggered by the “soft budget constraint” effect: the one put forward by
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and von Thadden (1995), where it is shown that hardening
the budget constraint may bring to an end valuable, but slow, projects and the one put
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forward by this paper, where we show that softening the budget constraint also causes the
increase of agency costs.
The goal of this section is to compare the results of a bankruptcy game with techno-
logical restructuring to the case in which bankruptcy is not allowed. More specifically, we
want to understand to what extent the chances for the long-term strategy to be selected at
equilibrium increase with bankruptcy and restructuring.
The outcome of this extension is a trade-off in which, on the one hand, restructuring
enables the attainment of a higher net value of the long-term project but, on the other hand,
the “soft budget constraint” problem puts at risk project’s implementation with respect to
the case in which renegotiation is not allowed.
We modify the structure of both the investment game and the bankruptcy game with
respect to Section 4. Firstly, we assume that the long-term project is subject to a shock that
may spoil its value and that this shock may happen with probability 1− σ.20
Secondly, we assume that in the second period the expected payoff returned by the long-
term project is perfectly correlated with the outcome of the first period, equal to Π̂ in the
case of success and zero in the case of a nil first period outcome. However, if permitted by
bankruptcy law, the entrepreneur undertakes a restructuring process that increases the payoff
of the project to Π̂ after a negative shock or a first period project failure. The restructuring
process succeeds with certainty and its outcome is publicly observable.21
Thirdly, in the framework with bankruptcy and restructuring, we follow the approach
of the costly state verification literature assuming that the lender can perfectly observe
the outcome of the project in the first period, by sending the entrepreneur to bankruptcy
and paying a fixed cost K.22 In other words, in the spirit of Gale and Hellwig (1985),
we are relaxing the assumption for which the true state is observable at an infinite cost.
Therefore, in the case with bankruptcy and restructuring, the contract specifies a decision
20This hypothesis allows for the enrichment of the analysis in an interesting fashion. Indeed, in absence
of such shock, restructuring would be feasible only after first period failure, which, given the moral hazard
problem design of Section 4, happens only in case of first period shirking. This means that restructuring
would just increase the rents attached to continuation in bankruptcy and make the long-term project even
less valuable in the case of renegotiation in bankruptcy.
21Here we are assuming that the restructuring project does not require any implementation cost and this
has two implications: the first is that the entrepreneur is always willing to undertake restructuring and the
second is that the payoff of the restructured project is the same as following first period success. We would
like to remark that introducing a restructuring cost does not change the nature of the results we present in
the following of this section.
22Also, the lender can observe whether the entrepreneur has been hit by the shock.
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rule, denoted by pj ∈ {0, 1}, with j = Π, 0, according to which the firm can be put in
bankruptcy and the project’s payoff verified, depending on the first period revealed outcome.
Moreover, the contract defines the payments required in bankruptcy - RbΠ and R
b
0-, and the
payments required out of bankruptcy - RΠ and R0. Finally, the introduction of the costly
state verification assumption implies that we need to impose that parties commit to the
bankruptcy policy specified in the contract, because otherwise they would never be willing
to sink the true state disclosure cost K ex post.23 However, we maintain the same stance
as in the model of Section 4 by assuming that the lender cannot commit to the refunding
decision and repayment (r̂) in project’s failure state, so that these will be determined by the
bankruptcy game.24
In particular, the new timing of the bankruptcy game is as follows:
1. The lender observes the true outcome at cost K.
2. The entrepreneur searches for new funds on competitive financial markets.
3. If the entrepreneur finds a new lender, this lender makes her an offer.
4. In case of offer acceptance, the entrepreneur undertakes the technological restructuring
process.
5. The old lender must decide either to agree to the continuation plan or reject it. The
old lender and the entrepreneur play an ultimatum game in which the former has all
the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm. Such an offer
specifies the payoff that he requires to allow the project’s continuation, indexed r̂j,
with j = Π, 0.
6. If the entrepreneur accepts the old lender’s offer, the firm continues its activity and
the second period time structure is the same as in the case of continuation out of
bankruptcy. Otherwise, the firm is shut down and the entrepreneur is dismissed.
Second period effort decision in bankruptcy is modeled as out of bankruptcy, while the
new payoff distribution is in Figure 2. Finally, the parametric hypotheses of Assumption 1
also hold in this section. However, we introduce Assumption 2 below.
23Indeed, as remarked by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), if the entrepreneur expects the policy to be
carried out, she always reports the cash flow’s exact realization. In turn, the lender, anticipating that the
truth is always communicated, would not have incentive to undertake the verification policy.
24In fact, were the lender able to commit on the value of the payments in bankruptcy, r̂, then he could




Π̂− Î − B̂ > K.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Assumption 2 introduces an upper bound to verification costs, K, and it implies that long
run project’s second period expected pledgeable income is not depleted after paying K.
7.1 Optimal Contract without Bankruptcy and Technological Re-
structuring
In this section we derive the contract that lender and entrepreneur sign when bankruptcy
(and technological restructuring) is not allowed: this framework corresponds to the one in
which parties cannot renegotiate the original deal at the interim stage. Lemma 2 presents
the equilibrium of the contracting game.
Lemma 2.
Denote by CNR the equilibrium contract that implements the long-term investment strategy
L in absence of bankruptcy and technological restructuring. CNR specifies that:
CNR ≡ {R = RNR ≡ I/σ, R̂ = Î}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 0}.
CNR can be implemented if first period limited liability,
Π ≥ I/σ,
The incentive constraint related to effort provision,
σΠ− I + σ(Π̂− Î) ≥ B, (2)
the truth telling constraint,
Π̂− Î − I/σ ≥ 0,
are satisfied. Then, borrower’s utility, denoted UNR, is equal to:
UNR = σΠ− I + σ(Π̂− Î).
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and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, long-term project L is chosen at equilib-
rium if:
σΠ− I + σ(Π̂− Î) ≥ ΠS. (3)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The risk of a negative shock increases the repayment required in the first period by the
lender, and this has two implications. Firstly, first period limited liability, the incentive
constraint and the truth telling constraint may not hold. Secondly, the value generated by
the long-term project is smaller than in the full commitment case of Section 5.25
7.2 Optimal Contract with Bankruptcy and Technological Re-
structuring
If bankruptcy allows the entrepreneur to restructure the firm in case of an adverse shock
or a first period failure, there are two conflicting forces that influence the contracting game
outcome and project choice. On the one hand, as shown in Section 6, renegotiation in
bankruptcy increases the agency costs attached to the implementation of project L. On the
other hand, technological restructuring can raise the value of the same project and make it
more profitable to the entrepreneur. Lemma 3 presents the optimal contract and the condi-
tions that determine project choice in this framework.
Lemma 3.
In a setting with bankruptcy and technological restructuring, two cases must be distin-
guished.
(i) If Π̂− Î − B̂−K < I, recovery rates are not enough to recoup the initial investment’s








0 = R0 = 0, R̂ = Î},
{pΠ = 0, p0 = 1}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 1}, {r̂Π = 0, r̂0 = Π̂− Î − B̂
}
.
CR can be implemented if first period limited liability
25Compare expressions (1) and (3).
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Π ≥ I − (Π̂− Î − B̂ −K)(1− σ)
σ
,
the incentive constraint related to effort provision,
σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î − B̂)− (1− σ)K ≥ B, (4)
are satisfied. Then, borrower’s utility, denoted UR, is equal to:
UR = σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î)−K(1− σ),
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, the long-term project L is chosen
at equilibrium if:
σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î)−K(1− σ) ≥ ΠS. (5)
(ii) If Π̂− Î − B̂−K ≥ I, recovery rates allow for the recouping of the initial investment’s
value. In this case, the optimal contract, CRs , specifies that:
CRs ≡ {RΠ = I, RbΠ = R0 = Rb0 = 0, R̂ = Î},
{pΠ = 0, p0 = 1}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 1}, {r̂Π = 0, r̂0 = I +K}.
CRs can be implemented if the incentive constraint related to effort provision,
σ(Π +K) ≥ B,
is satisfied. Then, borrower’s utility, denoted URs , is equal to:
URs = σΠ− (1− σ)K + (Π̂− Î − I),
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, long-term project L is chosen at
equilibrium if:
σΠ− (1− σ)K + (Π̂− Î − I) ≥ ΠS.
20
Proof. See Appendix D.
Focusing on the case in which Π̂ − Î − B̂ − K < I,26 the optimal contract specifies
putting the entrepreneur in bankruptcy and verify the project’s outcome only if a nil payoff
is reported (p0 = 1, pΠ = 0). Moreover, the entrepreneur never lies at equilibrium, as she
communicates to have zero cash only if she is hit by a negative shock.
7.3 Bankruptcy, Technological Restructuring and Short-termism
Proposition 3 compares the main features of CNR and CR, the optimal contracts presented in
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, respectively.27 This allows us to study how the short-termism result
presented in Proposition 2 fares when the entrepreneur is entitled to implement a project of
technological reorganization in bankruptcy.
Proposition 3.
With respect to the case without bankruptcy, bankruptcy with technological restructuring has
three effects:
(i) The utility of the entrepreneur increases, UR > UNR.
(ii) The contractual payment required in the first period decreases, RR < RNR.
(iii) There exists a threshold σ̄ < 1 such that:
∀ σ > σ̄ ≡ Π̂− Î − B̂ −K
Π̂− Î −K
The incentive constraint related to effort provision is more binding.
A trade off emerges at equilibrium. The main benefits of bankruptcy and restructuring
are two. The first is that that the value of the long-term project increases at equilibrium
and this raises the chances of it being chosen by the entrepreneur. The second is that the
first period transfer required by the lender is smaller, because he takes into account that
in bankruptcy he will extract a positive rent from the second period (through the recovery
rates). Consequently, (LL1) is more likely to hold under bankruptcy.
28
26We choose to discuss this case in more detail because it is the one in which the short-termism result
arises in the main model (see Proposition 2).
27Again, notice that we are restricting our attention to the results under r̂0 < I +K.
28A third benefit associated to bankruptcy is that the entrepreneur never lies along the equilibrium path,
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However, comparing the expressions of the incentive conditions related to the effort choice
evaluated at the optimal contracts,29 it emerges that, for high values of σ, such constraint
is more binding in the case with bankruptcy and restructuring. In other words, when a nil
outcome is less likely to be caused by unfortunate events, that is, if (1−σ) < (1−σ̄), avoiding
a “soft” stance in bankruptcy allows for the improvement of entrepreneur’s incentives.
Example. We now construct a simple example putting Proposition 3 at work: more
specifically, we provide a framework in which the trade-off between the conflicting forces
highlighted above can lead to inefficient investment decisions.
First of all, the set of critical values of sigma at which the relevant conditions in Lemma
2 and Lemma 3 hold are pinned down.
The values that satisfy the first period limited liability, incentive constraint and truth-














Π̂− Î + Π
In particular, if σ ≥ max{σNRLL , σNRIC , σNRTT } then the long-term project can be undertaken
in the case without bankruptcy.
Instead, the values that satisfy the first period limited liability and incentive constraint in
the case with bankruptcy and restructuring, denoted respectively by σRLL and σ
R
IC , are given
in what follows:
σRLL ≡
I − (Π̂− Î − B̂ −K)
Π− (Π̂− Î − B̂ −K)
σRIC ≡
B + I − (Π̂− Î − B̂ −K)
Π +K
In this case, project L can be undertaken if σ ≥ max{σRLL, σRIC}.
Without loss of generality, we introduce the following restrictions on the parameters of
the model:
(a) Π̂− Î = Π = 2I (b) B = B̂ (c) σ > 1/2
Restriction (a) implies that that the expected payoff of the project in the second period is
bigger than that of the first period. This is equivalent to assuming that project L is able to
while in the case without bankruptcy this happens only if the truth telling condition is satisfied.
29Compare conditions (2) and (4).
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generate very high gains only in the long-term. Restriction (b) implies that the moral hazard
problem is equally severe in the first and in the second period. Restriction (c) introduces an
upper bound to the probability of being hit by an adverse shock, equal to 1− σ. Moreover,
in this setting, Assumption 2 requires that Π−B−K > 0. Then the following result holds.
Corollary 1.
If 2B > Π > 4B/3, then bankruptcy with technological restructuring reduces the scope for
the implementation of the long-term project, L.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Corollary 1 shows that the short-termism result holds in this example provided the moral
hazard problem is severe enough and the probability of the adverse shock is low enough.
Indeed, under these conditions, in a non-empty range of values of σ, project L cannot be
implemented in the framework with bankruptcy and technological restructuring, but it can
be undertaken in the framework without bankruptcy. Like in the benchmark model of Section
4, short-temism is caused by the exacerbation of the repeated agency problem.
8 Monopoly Lender
In this section, we present the way in which the results of the model in Section 4 carry on
in a framework with a monopoly lender. In other words, we now assume that there is no
competition on financial markets in the first period, so that the lender is a monopolist to the
borrower. Even though this hypothesis is at odds with a major part of the corporate finance
literature, this case has a policy relevance because it is consistent with the financial markets’
competitive environments of countries like Germany, Italy and the UK, where banks hold a
strong bargaining power vis-à-vis firms.30
The twist we introduce with respect to the set-up in Section 4 consists of assuming that it
30With particular regard to the UK, this section is able to study the results of a renegotiation environment
analogous to the one that characterizes the London Approach, a widespread practice adopted by British firms’
management to implement the process of debt reorganization with creditors (typically big banks) out of the
court. The London Approach consists in informal negotiations between a distressed entrepreneur and her
lenders and it develops in two distinct phases that closely resemble a Chapter 11: in the first, a consortium
of investors agree on a “standstill” that relieves the entrepreneur from the obligation to pay back her debts
and in the second parties negotiate and implement a plan of financial restructuring.
23
is the first period lender who holds all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the entrepreneur at the contracting game stage. The offer consists of a contract
that specifies per period expected repayments, termination decisions and type of investment
project. The reversal of the bargaining power also implies that the lender squeezes all of the
net value of project S, ΠS. Finally, notice that, in bankruptcy, the entrepreneur has access
to competitive financial markets when searching for funding in the second period, as in the
game of Section 4.1.31
The result of this extension is analogous to the one with competitive financial markets,
even if at the cost of imposing one further assumption on the parameters of the model.
Assumption 3.
Π > B̂ > I.
Assumption 3 implies that the payment required at the end of the first period by the
equilibrium contract does not violate the first period limited liability constraint, but is bigger
than the initial investment cost, I, thus making bankruptcy a real concern. In the following,
we solve for the optimal contracts under full and limited commitment using Assumption 1
and Assumption 3.
8.1 Optimal Contract with Full Commitment
Lemma 4 presents the equilibrium project choice under the hypothesis of full commitment.
Lemma 4.
Denote by CFC,m the equilibrium contract that implements the long-term investment strategy
L under full commitment and monopolistic lending. CFC,m specifies that:
CFC,m ≡ {R = B̂, R̂ = Π̂− B̂}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 0}.
At CFC,m, lender’s utility, denoted V FC,m, is equal to:
V FC,m = Π̂− Î − I > 0.
31In this way we replicate Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), who studies a funding game in which first period
lender has full bargaining power at the contracting and renegotiation stage, while creditors intervening at
the interim stage are left with zero expected surplus.
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Entrepreneur’s utility, UFC,m, is equal to Π. Finally, the lender offers CFC,m to the en-
trepreneur if and only if:
V FC,m = Π̂− Î − I ≥ ΠS. (6)
The project is started if the entrepreneur accepts.
Proof. See Appendix F.
In this framework, first and second period transfers to the lender increase with respect
to the case with competitive financial markets. Moreover, because of the repeated moral
hazard problem, the value generated by project L to the lender is smaller than in the first
best. Consequently, while under competitive financial markets and full commitment project
L is always chosen by the firm, here it is started only if condition (6) holds. In other
words, the long-term project may not be undertaken, even when it is implementable, when
implementation becomes too costly. The rationale for this result is as follows. In Section 4,
the entrepreneur holds all the bargaining power and therefore, she is able to fully squeeze
the net value of the long-term project. Instead, here the lender must take into account
entrepreneur’s agency rent and this increases in the “soft” bankruptcy framework.
8.2 Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment
Under the hypothesis of limited commitment, we study how the possibility to renegotiate the
contract in an environment characterized by the bankruptcy game presented in Section 4.1
affects project’s choice.
Proposition 4.
Under limited commitment and monopolistic lending, long run project L cannot be imple-
mented without violating entrepreneur’s incentives.
Proof. See Appendix G.
The relaxation of the disciplining role imparted by the refunding decisions, and the con-
sequent increase of the reward necessary to induce the right incentives, implies that the
entrepreneur would always have incentive to divert first period profits insofar as the lender
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sets a positive value of R.
Overall, we can conclude that the result on short-termism derived under competitive
financial markets is even reinforced under monopolistic lending: in the competitive bench-
mark, the long-run project can be undertaken with limited commitment, provided recovery
rates are big enough. In this case, the project cannot be implemented independently from
recovery rates’ value.
9 Collaterized Loan
In this section, we present the results of the contracting and bankruptcy games of Section
6 when the entrepreneur can pledge collateral, C.32 More specifically, we assume that C
consists of entrepreneur’s existing non-project-related wealth33 and that it can be seized by
the lender in case of first period project’s failure. Furthermore, the existence of C affects the
implementation of the long-term project L differently depending on whether the procedure
entitles the entrepreneur to invoke the automatic stay of creditor’s claim. If the automatic
stay is not contemplated by the bankruptcy law, then the lender can decide either to seize
the collateral or to allow for project’s continuation in bankruptcy. Instead, if protected
by the automatic stay, the entrepreneur has the right to enter unilaterally in bankruptcy
and the collateral is added to project’s continuation value, so that lender’s recovery rates
increase.
It has to be remarked that C cannot violate first period limited liability constraint, there-
fore one must have that the following feasibility condition holds: C ≤ Π − I.34 Also, the
entrepreneur has incentive to raise as much collateral as possible, subject to the feasibility
condition, because if project L is chosen her utility would be bigger than if the short-term
project is chosen.
To begin with, consider the case in which the procedure does not prescribe the automatic
stay of lender’s claim. Then the lender may decide to seize the collateral instead of continuing
with the rescue phase in bankruptcy, provided the value of the collateral is bigger than
the project’s continuation value. Accordingly, the budget constraint would be naturally
32We follow Tirole 2006, Chapter 4, in the way collateral is modeled.
33More concretely, C may consist of wealth that is too illiquid to be invested directly into the project, but
can be used as collateral, like an entrepreneur’s house or firm’s stock holdings in other companies.
34This condition is obtained by substituting into the limited liability constraint the optimal value of R,
which results from a binding lender’s participation constraint using the assumption of competitive financial
markets.
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tightened. Indeed, the truth-telling constraint could be rewritten as in what follows:
Π− I + Π̂− Î ≥ Π− C.
Hence, if the entrepreneur is able to raise an amount of collateral that satisfies the truth-
telling condition and the feasibility condition, project L is chosen at equilibrium. The in-
tuition is that, by seizing C, the lender can implement a particularly harsh punishment in
case of failure, even harsher than in the full commitment scenario. Remarkably, this type
of lender’s conduct in failure states is consistent with the evidence in Franks and Sussman
(2005), which finds that in the presence of highly collaterized debt a senior lender is more
likely to seize the collateral instead of commencing the rescue process.
If the procedure prescribes the automatic stay, then the collateral is used by the en-
trepreneur in addition to the income generated by project’s continuation in bankruptcy.
Therefore, in this case, the value of r̂ increases to min{Π̂ − Î − B̂ + C, I}, so that if the
entrepreneur is able to raise C such that Π̂− Î − B̂ +C ≥ I and the feasibility condition is
satisfied, then the truth-telling constraint holds and project L is chosen at equilibrium.
Concluding, in both scenarios collateral increases the scope for the implementation of
the long-term project. However, only in the case without automatic stay the “soft budget
constraint” problem is fixed, as in that case the lender is entitled to decide whether to seize
the collateral and stop project continuation independently from the procedure.
Proposition 5.
Under limited commitment, collateral facilitates the choice of the long-term project L.
The result in Proposition 5 is delivered by focusing on a lender-borrower couple. The
analysis could be greatly enriched by looking at a model with multiple lenders and analyzing
whether the same results would carry over (see Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Berglöf
et al. (forthcoming) for frameworks with multiple lenders), but this is not the scope of this
paper.
10 Testable Predictions and Policy Conclusion
The paper delivers two main testable predictions. The first consists of showing that, by
worsening the agency problem, “soft” bankruptcy systems generate bigger indirect costs.35
35In this model, we deal with indirect costs because we show that agency costs paid by investors increase
when the entrepreneur anticipates a lenient bankruptcy procedure. Direct costs, instead, would comprise of
27
This prediction is consistent Franks and Sussman (2005). In particular, Franks and Sussman
(2005) shows that, in the UK, banks commit to a severe stance towards debt renegotiations
and it is argued that this is done to avoid strategic default. In Section 6, we have shown that,
unless recovery rates are not big enough to allow for the full recouping of the outstanding
liability, then the entrepreneur would always default strategically by reporting a nil payoff
at the end of the first period.
The second and major prediction of the paper regards the effect that the limited com-
mitment problem characterizing “soft” procedures has on ex ante investment choices: more
specifically, in our model, agency costs increase to generate a bias for short-termism. This
result is consistent with the evidence provided by several empirical studies on the pressure
exerted by stake-holders on American corporate executives for the achievement of short-
term objectives.36 Further evidence to our finding is provided by Qian and Strahan (2007)
and John et al. (2008). The former shows that stronger creditor protection is associated
with lower interest rates and longer term lending, the latter proves that stronger creditor
protection triggers more value-enhancing investments. Interestingly, coherently with our
theoretical analysis and results, John et al. (2008) claims that stronger creditor protection
hampers managers’ rent extraction behavior and triggers efficient investment choices .
The conclusion conveyed by this paper is that it is the joint rights on the entrepreneur’s
side (to file unilaterally for bankruptcy, to decide on the firm’s restructuring and search
for new funds), that exacerbate agency costs. Consequently, the bankruptcy reforms that
implement a system which limits the capability of the bankrupt entrepreneur to extract rents
from the distressed company during the reorganization phase, like the German one, should
be less afflicted by the inefficiencies we highlight. This conclusion is also corroborated by the
evidence in Bharath et al. (2007), in which the authors show that management turnover in
Chapter 11 has increased by 65% since 1990 and is observed in 37.7% of reorganization cases
the expenses necessary to carry out the process of reorganization/liquidation. See Senbet and Seward (1995)
for a survey over indirect and direct costs of bankruptcy.
36More specifically, the survey by Poterba and Summers (1995) shows that American CEOs are perceived
to have a time horizon considerably shorter than their competitors in Europe. Also, Poterba and Summers
(1995), as well as Blume et al. (1980), provides an estimate of firms’ cut-off rates that substantially exceeds
the real market discount rate. Finally, Corbett (1987) points to the difference in funded projects’ length to
show that Anglo-Saxon corporations are subject to a stronger bias towards short-termism than their German
and Japanese counterparts. The theoretical literature has usually explained this evidence comparing the
binding role that the risk of takeovers have in the American economy with the long-term horizons that the
relationship-banking system gives to firms in Continental Europe and Japan. This paper, instead, proposes
an alternative theory based on the way bankruptcy law affects ex ante entrepreneur’s incentives.
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in 2000. Remarkably, such an increase has been accompanied by the decrease of Absolute
Priority Rule (APR hereafter) violations in Chapter 11.37 This piece of evidence bears
witnesses to a growing influence exerted by creditors in Chapter 11, at the expenses of the
bankrupt management. Our model rationalizes these results showing that tightening the
termination threat reduces the indirect costs of bankruptcy.
11 Final Remarks
We employ a model with repeated moral hazard in which an entrepreneur can choose between
a long-term and a short-term project: the former is more valuable than the latter but is
subject to the risk of bankruptcy. Crucially, “soft” bankruptcy is modeled as a renegotiation
game and gives the entrepreneur the right to start a process of financial restructuring.
The main insight of the paper is that, under a “soft” procedure, the implementation of the
optimal financing contracts is subject to a problem of “soft budget constraint”, for which the
lender is tempted to renegotiate the termination clause and let the entrepreneur continue, if
recovery rates increase. In the presence of moral hazard, the relaxation of the termination
decision increases agency costs making the long-term strategies unprofitable and creating a
bias for short-termism.
We analyze the robustness of the short-termism result, show that it holds in an environ-
ment with monopolistic lending and if the law allows the bankrupt entrepreneur to devise a
process of technological restructuring. In particular, in the extension with bankruptcy and
technological restructuring, bankruptcy allows the entrepreneur to rescue the firm’s value
after a first period low outcome, which can be caused either by opportunistic behavior or
by an adverse, exogenous shock. The resulting equilibrium features short-termism when the
moral hazard problem is particularly harsh. However, it also features an efficient investment
choice if the likelihood of the exogenous shock is high enough. Finally, we look at a variant
of the main model with collaterized loan and show that the soft-budget constraint problem
may be alleviated when the entrepreneur can pledge collateral.
Although not directly related, our model can be employed to understand the possible
consequences of the rescue plan decided by main western countries to counteract the financial
crisis that affected the international banking system in the Fall of 2008. In an effort to
inject trust in the financial markets, governments have guaranteed to intervene and protect
37The APR determines the order of creditors’ claims reimbursement in bankruptcy. It states that creditors
who have secured their loans have seniority over other creditors, and, therefore, have the right to be paid
back first.
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major banks against the risk of failure. In this paper, we highlight that the likely effect of
such a lenient policy is to increase the pressure exerted by investors for short-run corporate
results, unless it is not accompanied by the turnover of the incumbent management found
liable.38
A Proof of Lemma 1
In this section, we derive the optimal contract that implements the long run investment
project L under the assumption of full commitment.
max
{R, bR}{ζΠ,ζ0} Π−R + ζΠ(Π̂− R̂)
Π−R + ζΠ(Π̂− R̂) ≥

Π + ζ0(Π̂− R̂) (TT )
B + ζ0(Π̂− R̂) (IC)
0 (ePC)
R− I + ζΠ(R̂− Î) ≥ 0 (lPC)
Π−R ≥ 0 (LL1)
Π̂− R̂ ≥ 0 (LL2)
(ζΠ, ζ0) ∈ {0, 1} (FC)
The entrepreneur maximizes her utility subject to three incentive constraints: the truth
telling constraint (TT ), the incentive constraint related to effort provision (IC), and her
participation constraint (ePC). Also, the entrepreneur takes into account the lender’s par-
ticipation constraint (lPC), first and second period limited liability constraints, (LL1) and
(LL2), and the feasibility conditions (FC).
38Particularly suggestive is the following quotation by the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, commenting
on the necessity to introduce stronger regulation concerning banks’ management rewarding schemes: “We
are leading the world in sweeping away the old short-term bonus culture of the past and replacing it with
determination that there are no rewards for failure and rewards only for long-term success”. The Guardian,
10th February 2009.
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Conditional on project continuation, in the second period, perfect competition drives the
repayment required by the lender to Î, so that R̂ = Î. This implies that the entrepreneur is
the residual claimant and gets the all net present value generated by the project, which is
equal to Π̂− Î.
The optimal contract is completed by first period repayment and lender’s refunding deci-
sions. First of all, notice that due to Assumption (1.i), the only relevant incentive constraint
is (TT ). Then, financial markets’ perfect competition implies that first period repayment,
R, is equal to I. Finally, the problem can be simplified setting ζ0 = 0 and ζΠ = 1, the
entrepreneur is not rewarded if she reveals 0, while she is refunded if she reveals Π: both
simplifications improve entrepreneur’s incentives, the latter also increases entrepreneur’s ex-
pected utility. Therefore, at the equilibrium, constraint (TT ) is never binding (thanks to
Assumption (1.iv)), while the lender earns zero profits.
Denote by CFC the optimal contract that implements strategy L. CFC is given by:
CFC ≡ {R = I, R̂ = Î}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 0},
at which entrepreneur’s utility is equal to:
UFC = Π− I + Π̂− Î > 0.
In order to implement L, the entrepreneur offers CFC to the lender, and the project is
started if the latter accepts the deal and provides I. 
B Proof of Proposition 2
The optimization problem is as in what follows.
max
{R, bR}{ζΠ,ζ0} Π−R + ζΠ(Π̂− R̂)
Π−R + ζΠ(Π̂− R̂) ≥

Π + ζ0(Π̂− R̂)− r̂ (TT )
B + ζ0(Π̂− R̂)− r̂ (IC)
0 (ePC)
R− I + ζΠ(R̂− Î) ≥ 0 (lPC)
Π−R ≥ 0 (LL1)
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Π̂− R̂ ≥ 0 (LL2)
(ζΠ, ζ0) ∈ {0, 1} (FC)
To begin with, r̂ reduces the rent that the entrepreneur obtains when she reveals a nil
payoff and the firm is in bankruptcy. Then, two scenarios must be distinguished. If the firm
is not in bankruptcy, by perfect competition, the required payment in the second period, R̂,
is equal to Î.
If the firm is in bankruptcy, the game presented in Section 4.1 takes place. More specifi-
cally, if the entrepreneur finds a new lender, this makes her an offer at which the entrepreneur
is residual claimant and the new lender breaks even in expectation. Consequently, conditional
on offer acceptance, second period expected pledgeable income is equal to Π̂ − Î − B̂ > 0.
However, before the project is implemented, the old lender must agree on continuation.
The old lender has monopoly power in the ultimatum game with the entrepreneur: he
makes her an offer consisting in the value of r̂ required to allow continuation. In particular,
the initial lender asks at least the minimum value between the pledgeable income of the
project and the value of the outstanding liability, that is, the old lender offers either r̂ >
min{Π̂− Î− B̂, I} or r̂ = min{Π̂− Î− B̂, I}. In the former case, the lender would implicitly
enforce the ex ante optimal contract, because the entrepreneur would not be able to repay
and parties’ payoffs would be zero at the end of bargaining. In the latter case, the offer is
feasible and would permit the old lender to improve recovery rates.
At the SPE of the bargaining game, the old lender asks for r̂ = min{Π̂ − Î − B̂, I} and
the entrepreneur accepts. Consequently, recovery rates increase and the refunding decisions,
{ζΠ, ζ0}, become ineffective (that is, ζΠ = ζ0 = 1). Using the results we have derived so far,
the truth-telling constraint can be rewritten as:
Π− I + (Π̂− Î) ≥ Π + (Π̂− Î)−min{Π̂− Î − B̂, I},
Hence, one has that:
i. If Π̂ − Î − B̂ < I, project S is chosen by the entrepreneur, because the truth-telling
constraint is not satisfied.
ii. If Π̂− Î − B̂ ≥ I, the entrepreneur offers CLC to the lender.
CLC ≡ {R = I, R̂ = Î , r̂ = I}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 1}.
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Borrower’s utility under CLC , denoted ULC , is:
ULC = Π− I + Π̂− Î > 0
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, if the lender accepts the offer, project
L is started. 
C Proof of Lemma 2
The optimization problem follows.
max
{R, bR}{ζΠ,ζ0}σ[Π−R + ζΠ(Π̂− R̂)]
σ[Π−R + ζΠ(Π̂− R̂)] ≥

σ[Π + ζ0(Π̂− R̂)] (TT )
B (IC)
0 (ePC)
σR− I + σζΠ(R̂− Î) ≥ 0 (lPC)
Π−R ≥ 0 (LL1)
Π̂− R̂ ≥ 0 (LL2)
(ζΠ, ζ0) ∈ {0, 1} (FC)
First of all, perfect competition on financial markets implies that the payment required
in the second period is equal to Î. Moreover, as for Lemma 1, the refunding decision in case
of success and no adverse shock is equal to one, while the refunding decision associated to
a nil outcome is equal to zero. Then, lender’s zero profit condition implies that first period
transfer is equal to I/σ. Consequently, (TT ), (IC) and (LL1) can be rewritten, as:
σ(Π̂− Î)− I ≥ 0 (TT )
σΠ− I + σ(Π̂− Î) ≥ B (IC)
σΠ− I ≥ 0 (LL1)
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Denote by CNR the optimal contract that implements strategy L in the case without
bankruptcy and technological restructuring. CNR is given by:
CNR ≡ {R = RNR ≡ I/σ, R̂ = Î}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 0},
at which entrepreneur’s utility is equal to:
UNR = σΠ− I + σ(Π̂− Î).
Provided the limited liability condition, the incentive constraint and the truth telling
constraint are satisfied. The entrepreneur offers CNR to the lender, and project L is started
if
σΠ− I + σ(Π̂− Î) ≥ ΠS.

D Proof of Lemma 3
In this section, we derive the optimal contract that implements the long run investment
project L in the case with bankruptcy and technological restructuring. The optimization





σ[Π− pΠ(RbΠ + ζΠr̂Π)− (1− pΠ)RΠ] + (1− σ)[−p0(Rb0 + ζ0r̂0) +
−(1− p0)R0] + [σζΠ + (1− σ)ζ0](Π̂− R̂) ≥
{
B − p0(Rb0 + ζ0r̂0)− (1− p0)R0 + ζ0(Π̂− R̂) (IC1)
0 (ePC)
σ[pΠ(RbΠ+ζΠr̂Π−K)+(1−pΠ)RΠ]+(1−σ)[p0(Rb0+ζ0r̂0−K)+(1−p0)R0]+[σζΠ+(1−σ)ζ0](R̂−Î) ≥ I (lPC)
{
RbΠ ≤ R0 ∀(pΠ = 1, p0 = 0), Rb0 ≤ RΠ ∀(p0 = 1, pΠ = 0)
RΠ = R0 = R if pΠ = p0 = 0
(IC2)
{
Π−RΠ ≥ 0 R0 ≤ 0
Π−RbΠ ≥ 0 Rb0 ≤ 0
(LL1)
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Π̂− R̂ ≥ 0 (LL2)
(ζΠ, ζ0) ∈ {0, 1}
(pΠ, p0) ∈ {0, 1}
K is the cost that must be sunk to retrieve the true outcome in bankruptcy and the
couple (pΠ, p0) determines the bankruptcy policy: if pj = 1, with j = Π, 0, then the contract
requires that the firm is put in bankruptcy and the true outcome is monitored at the cost
K. RbΠ, r̂Π, R
b
0 and r̂0 characterize the payments and recovery rates required in bankruptcy
as function of the first period outcome, while RΠ and R0 denote the payments required out
of bankruptcy.
First of all, we can rewrite the problem setting ζΠ = ζ0 = 1, as in Section 6.
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Moreover, all transfers must satisfy first and second period limited liability conditions.
However, with respect to the problem in Section 6, we also need to take into account the
set of incentive compatibility constraints (IC2). These make sure that the transfers required
out of bankruptcy do not depend on revealed outcome, otherwise the entrepreneur would lie
as to avoid the bigger repayment. Similarly, the payments required in bankruptcy must be
smaller than those out of bankruptcy, otherwise the entrepreneur would report the outcome
that entails a lower repayment.
In case a nil outcome is reported, the firm is always put in bankruptcy (p0 = 1), and
verification costs K paid by the lender, because otherwise the entrepreneur would claim to
have zero cash and repay nothing. Conversely, the optimal contract must feature pΠ = 0:
if the outcome is high, the entrepreneur can repay the amount specified in the contract
(provided limited liability is satisfied).
Then, before solving for the optimal contractual payments, together with the bankruptcy
policy that makes sure that the true outcome is revealed by the entrepreneur, we can op-
erate a number of simplifications. Indeed, invoking the assumption of perfectly competitive




As for r̂0, in analogy to Section 6, this is given by min{Π̂− Î−B̂, I+K}: at the bargaining
game with the entrepreneur, the old lender formulates an offer at which he gets the minimum
between the full value of the project in the second period and the allotment invested to start
the project and verify the true state. Finally, denote by RR = RΠ the value that solves a
39In Section 6, we prove that, in absence of commitment, the assumption of second period positive pledge-
able income implies that the refunding decisions play no role whatsoever.
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binding (lPC).
In what follows, we first present the case in which recovery rates (net of K) are smaller
than first period investment’s value I, then the one in which recovery rates in bankruptcy
allow to fully recoup I.
Case r̂0 < I +K
If r̂0 = Π̂− Î − B̂ < I +K, the lender breaks even in expectation if:
RR =
I − (Π̂− Î − B̂ −K)(1− σ)
σ
> I.
Using the results we have derived so far, condition (IC1) can be written as:
σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î − B̂)− (1− σ)K ≥ B
Denote by CR the optimal contract that implements strategy L in the case with bankruptcy








0 = R0 = 0, R̂ = Î},
{pΠ = 0, p0 = 1}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 1}, {r̂Π = 0, r̂0 = Π̂− Î − B̂
}
.
CR can be implemented if first period limited liability,
Π ≥ I − (Π̂− Î − B̂ −K)(1− σ)
σ
,
and the incentive constraint related to effort provision,
σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î − B̂)− (1− σ)K ≥ B,
are satisfied. Then, borrower’s utility, denoted UR, is equal to:
UR = σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î)−K(1− σ).
The lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, the entrepreneur offers CR to the lender,
and the long run project L is started if:
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σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î)−K(1− σ) ≥ ΠS.
Case r̂0 = I +K
If r̂0 = I +K ≥ Π̂− Î − B̂, the optimal contract is given by
CRs ≡ {RΠ = I, RbΠ = R0 = Rb0 = 0, R̂ = Î},
{pΠ = 0, p0 = 1}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 1}, {r̂Π = 0, r̂0 = I +K}.
CRs can be implemented if the incentive constraint related to effort provision,
σ(Π +K) ≥ B,
is satisfied. Then, borrower’s utility, denoted URs , is equal to:
URs = σΠ− I + (Π̂− Î)− (1− σ)K.
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, the entrepreneur offers CRs to the
lender, and the long run project L is started if:
σΠ− (1− σ)K + (Π̂− Î − I) ≥ ΠS.

E Proof of Corollary 1
In this section, we want to show that in a non-empty range of values of σ, the implementation
of the long run project is put at risk by renegotiation in bankruptcy.
First of all, by using restrictions (a)− (c), one can easily show that σNRLL = σNRTT = 1/2 >
σRLL. In other words, the truth telling constraint and the limited liability condition hold in the
case without bankruptcy, as well as the limited liability condition in the case with bankruptcy
and restructuring. Then, the relevant conditions are the incentive constraints.
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Moreover, notice that σNRIC and σ
NR
IC lie in the interval (1/2,1) under the conditions set
up in Corollary 1. Indeed, σNRIC < 1 if Π > B, σ
NR
IC > 1/2 if Π < 2B and 1 > σ
R
IC > 1/2 if
2B > Π > 4B/3. Finally, we need to show that σRIC ≥ σNRIC :
σRIC =








Solving for such inequality, one has that:
2Π(B + Π/2) + 2Π(K − Π +B) > (Π +K)(B + Π/2)⇒
2Π(K − Π +B) > (K − Π)(B + Π/2)⇒
(Π−K)(B + Π/2) > 2Π(Π−K)− 2ΠB ⇒
(Π−K)(3Π/2−B) < 2ΠB ⇒
Π(3Π/2− 3B) < K(3Π/2−B)
The left-hand side of the last inequality is negative if Π < 2B, which completes the proof
of Corollary 1. 
F Proof of Lemma 4
In this section, we derive the optimal contract that implements the long run investment
project L under the assumption of full commitment and monopolistic lending.
max
{R, bR}{ζΠ,ζ0}R− I + ζΠ(R̂− Î)
Π−R + ζΠ(Π̂− R̂) ≥

Π + ζ0(Π̂− R̂) (TT )
B + ζ0(Π̂− R̂) (IC)
0 (ePC)
R− I + ζΠ(R̂− Î) ≥ 0 (lPC)
Π−R ≥ 0 (LL1)
Π̂− R̂ ≥ 0 (LL2)
(ζΠ, ζ0) ∈ {0, 1} (FC)
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If the entrepreneur is solvent in the first period, in the second period the lender rewards
her with B̂, as to induce effort and extract R̂ − Î = Π̂ − Î − B̂. Conversely, if insolvent in
the first period, the entrepreneur is put in liquidation.
By Assumption (1.i), the only relevant incentive constraint is (TT ), moreover, this con-
straint is binding at equilibrium, otherwise the lender could always profitably increase R
without violating (TT ). As in Appendix A, then, one can set ζ0 = 0 and ζΠ = 1 and
consequently have that R = B̂ > I. The optimal contract, denoted CFC,m, follows:
CFC,m ≡ {R = B̂, R̂ = Π̂− B̂}, {ζΠ = 1, ζ0 = 0}.
Lender’s utility, given by project L pledgeable income, and denoted by V FC,m, is equal
to:
V FC,m = Π̂− Î − I > 0.
Entrepreneur’s utility, UFC,m, amounts to Π. Therefore, at equilibrium, if V FC,m >
ΠS the lender offers CFC,m to the entrepreneur and the long-term project is started if the
entrepreneur accepts. 
G Proof of Proposition 4
The optimization problem is the same as in Lemma 4. If the entrepreneur is solvent at the
end of the first period, the reward that the old lender promises to the entrepreneur in the
second period is equal to B̂. In this way he induces effort and generates Π̂ − Î − B̂. In
case of bankruptcy, instead, the renegotiation game presented in Section 4.1 takes place.
If the entrepreneur finds a new lender, the assumption of competitive financial markets
in the renegotiation phase drives new lenders’ expected surplus to zero, while makes the
entrepreneur the residual claimant. Therefore, second period expected pledgeable income in
bankruptcy is the same as out of bankruptcy and equal to Π̂− B̂ − Î > 0.
Before the project is implemented, the old investor must agree on continuation. The old
lender has monopoly power in the ultimatum game with the agent and makes an offer to
the firm consisting in the value of r̂ required to allow continuation. More specifically, the
old lender can offer either r̂ > Π̂− Î − B̂ or r̂ = Π̂− Î − B̂. In the former case, the lender
would implicitly enforce the ex ante optimal contract, because the entrepreneur would not
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be able to repay. In the latter case, the offer is feasible and would permit the old lender to
improve recovery rates. At the SPE of this game, the old lender asks for r̂ = Π̂ − B̂ − Î,
which is what he would have been able to extract from the project in case of refunding, and
the entrepreneur accepts. Consequently, the refunding decisions, {ζΠ, ζ0}, become ineffective




R− I + Π̂− Î − B̂
Π−R + B̂ = Π + B̂ (TT )
R− I + Π̂− Î − B̂ ≥ 0 (lPC)
Π−R ≥ 0 (LL1)
Clearly, a binding (TT ) is violated at any strictly positive value of the first period repay-
ment, R. 
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Figure 1: Timeline and Cash Flow
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Figure 2: Model with Bankruptcy and Restructuring, Cash Flows
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